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The Trafficking in Persons Report: a game of risk

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The State Department ranks countries on adherence to minimum standards set forth by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000. The *Trafficking in Persons Report* (TIP) is updated annually and failure to enact changes to combat trafficking results in higher tier rankings. This paper evaluates the TIP by situating this tool in light of special features of the modern era, such as globalization and risk. Through a survey of the theoretical literature on risk and on trafficking risk factors, we devise six preliminary risk clusters and discuss how the TIP could incorporate governments' response to trafficking risk factors into the ranking system. Our intentions are to spark debate about how risk factors could be incorporated in the TIP, to provide a preliminary model and to encourage further research in this area.

Keywords: Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP); human trafficking; sex trafficking; risk; public policy

Introduction

To combat the issue of human trafficking, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) established a three-pronged approach (also known as the three P's): prevention, prosecution, and protection (TVPA, 2000). This approach is initiated by the State Department through the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP),[1] which compiles global information on human trafficking and "assists anti-trafficking programs and raises awareness" (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013). TIP or the Report is comprised of narratives detailing (1) country level efforts for prevention, prosecution, and protection; (2) categorization as a country of origin, transit, or destination (or any combination thereof); and (3) tier rankings of countries (US Department of State, 2011).[2] In the Report, there is a lack of specificity about how tier rankings are calculated, but it stipulates that rankings are based on some combination of governments' responses to combat their trafficking situation in terms of the "three P's," but with little mention of preventive measures, or how countries' categorizations contribute to rankings.

In the first edition of TIP in 2001, there was a lack of clarity about the distinction between migrant smuggling and human trafficking (Gallagher, 2011). This confusion may in part have been due to the emergence of trafficking as a relatively new global issue and the many permutations of smuggling scenarios (Agustin, 2006; Chacon, 2006). In general, smuggling does not involve coercion, but rather being trafficked voluntarily. However, the boundary between voluntary and involuntary can be hard to pinpoint and can even shift within one individual experience, and there is often disagreement within the literature over

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who qualifies as trafficked. Molland (2010), for example, describes a scenario of young women in Laos who were smuggled from the countryside to work in an urban bar, where it turned out that many other female employees worked on the side as sex workers. The smuggled women were given the option of working for low wages only selling drinks to pay off their debts, but chose to also start doing sex work from the bar because they decided it was the best way to pay off their smuggling debts. When Molland presented these narratives to a panel of local trafficking experts to categorize them as trafficked or not trafficked, they could not come to any consensus about whether this situation should be classified as trafficking or voluntary prostitution. There is confusion and ambiguity about what counts legally and academically as trafficking and coercion. Some people can decide of their own volition to do sex work, but for various reasons be categorized as trafficked. Others can start out in non-coercive smuggling situations entered into voluntarily, then become coerced or exploited so that they qualify as being trafficked. For instance, many women in Eastern Europe are promised jobs as au pairs, entertainers, barmaids, or housekeepers in Western Europe and other regions, and are not aware of what they will actually be doing, which may include prostitution (Kligman & Limoncelli, 2005; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; Vocks & Nijboer, 2000). Even when trafficking is clearly occurring, at the outset most victims are not aware that they are being recruited for a trafficking scheme (European Conference of Preventing and Combatting Trafficking, 2002, 2003, as cited in Woodtich, DuPont-Morales, & Hummer, 2009) and are only later subject to forced, bonded labor or sex trafficking after voluntarily entering host countries.

The initial versions of TIP focused on cross-border trafficking, and primarily sex trafficking (Gallagher, 2011), but the Report later adopted a definition of human trafficking that applies to both cross-border and domestic trafficking and overall broader types of severe labor exploitation. The Report now defines human trafficking as "the act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a person for compelled labor or commercial sex acts through the use of force, fraud, or coercion" (US Department of State 2011, p. 3). The types of severe labor exploitation under human trafficking include forced labor, bonded labor, debt bondage, forced marriage, forced begging, exploitative adoption, child sex tourism, child soldiering, sex trafficking, and organ removal (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013). The changes in emphasis about what falls under the umbrella of human trafficking have likely contributed to the fuzziness of how tier rankings should be established, and perhaps to the lack of transparency in how they are calculated. Even though the current definition of human trafficking may be viewed as too all encompassing, the specificity of activities that constitute trafficking make it possible to pinpoint risk factors for different types of trafficking, many of which are overlapping.

The backbone of prevention is risk. Identifying global and local realities of trafficking risk may ultimately help governments to locate meaningful preventive measures to mitigate these risks. This paper explores why and how risk may be important to understanding the global phenomenon of human trafficking. We identify risks of human trafficking, and evaluate how risk may be more readily incorporated into the annual TIP and used as part of the calculation for tier rankings. The Report states that "placements into one of the four tiers are based more on the extent of government action to combat trafficking than on the size of the problem" (US Department of State, 2011, p. 37). Furthermore, they only factor in government programs that specifically target trafficking, ignoring other prevention programs that might indirectly prevent trafficking, such as "broad-based law enforcement or developmental initiatives," even if those broader programs would significantly prevent the problem. However, as more information is

compiled about risk, especially actionable risks related to human trafficking, incorporating risk assessment, and funding broad-based initiatives may prove to be essential to effectively combating human trafficking.

Modernization: a risky business

Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, the two most prominent "risk society" theorists, argue that we are moving from an "industrial society" to a "risk society" (which is characterized by new uncertainties, rising individualism, and basic changes in major social institutions). Beck coined the term "reflexive modernization" to describe two aspects of this new period. In the reflex stage, risks are byproducts of progress and modernization, but they are not recognized as such. In the reflection stage, there is critical reflection about the self-imposed nature of such dangers, and we begin to view ourselves as living in a risk society (Beck, 1992). Beck and Giddens hold that our age of "reflexive modernity" entails a "systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself" (Beck, 1992, p. 21). They identify how the progress of science and technology, intended to reduce risks and increase stability, instead often ironically leads to instability, unpredictability, and new types of risk (such as new technologies so beneficial in the short term leading to the unintended long-term consequence of catastrophic global climate change) (Giddens, 1991). We face many unknown risks from the unintentional consequences of our new technologies and other ostensibly beneficial developments in modernization – dangers that are, crucially, byproducts of progress itself, such as global financial instability, new forms of terrorism, and human trafficking.

Giddens and Beck call these new risks "manufactured risks," (as opposed to traditional "external risks," which were faced in all previous eras and derived "from the fixities of tradition or nature" (Giddens, 2002, p. 26). Manufactured risks, for Giddens (2007, p. 26), are historically unprecedented and "created by the very impact of our developing knowledge upon the world," especially by the accelerating and unpredictable developments of globalization. These new classes of risks are not always evident to the senses, they often have long-term effects, and they are often global in scale, thus hard to contain. No previous generations have had to deal with these specific self-imposed risks on the same scale, and their brand-new nature calls for new types of analysis.

Giddens (2002, p. 34) emphasizes that we do not live in an overall more dangerous or riskier world, but that "the balance of risks and dangers has shifted." Today, "hazards created by ourselves are as, or more, threatening than those that come from outside" (Giddens, 2002, p. 34). Because these risks are so unprecedented, there is not yet enough data to make reliable actuarial predictions about them, which makes them fundamentally different from traditional risks. However, Giddens (2002, p. 35) asserts that considering the prevalence of such risks in our era, we must "be bold rather than cautious in supporting scientific innovation or other forms of change" to measure and address these new risks. Because these dangers have become so prevalent, we must strive to conduct the research necessary to more and more accurately assess their risks. For example, a refrain throughout the literature on human trafficking bemoans the lack of quantitative empirical research about the problem (Logan, Walker, & Hunt, 2009; Petrunov, 2011; Salt, 2000; Tyldum, 2010). For instance, there are no reliable estimates on sex trafficking, globally or domestically in the United States, particularly not of trafficked minors, but this has been portrayed as a widespread problem (Horning, 2013; Marcus et al., 2012). Without such data, reliably assessing these new manufactured risks is challenging, but improves as the field matures.

The economics of risk: measuring the immeasurable

Chicago School economist Frank Knight provides another taxonomy of risks, which became the standard in the field of economics. He distinguishes between risks and uncertainties based on whether or not it is possible to calculate their probabilities (i.e., whether or not a situation's probability distributions are known (or knowable) at the outset of an analysis). Situations with unknown outcomes, but known probability distributions, are classified as risks. Situations with unknown outcomes, but also unknown probability distributions, are classified as uncertainties (which are fundamentally different from and more unwieldy than calculable risks). In the context of insurance, these unquantifiable (thus uninsurable) uncertainties are often considered "pure luck [or] changes that no one could have foreseen," (Knight, 1921, p. 44) such as cataclysmic weather events whose probabilities are unknown.

For Knight, uncertainties can become quantifiable (i.e., "easily converted into effective certainty" (1921, p. 46) with the accumulation of information about them. They "become predictable in accordance with the laws of chance and the error in such prediction approaches zero as the number of cases is increased" (Knight, 1921, p. 46). So what is necessary to convert an incalculable uncertainty into a calculable risk is "a sufficient number of cases to reduce the uncertainty to any desired limits" (Knight, 1921, p. 46). This approach to distinguishing between uncertainty and risk is somewhat subjective, since the "desired limit" of uncertainty is context-specific, depending on one's tolerance for error.

Methodologically, these data about cases can come from occurrences of the actual event in question or from analogous situations (e.g., probabilities about natural disasters can be derived from data from previous occurrences of the disaster in question or – less reliably – from comparable ones). Furthermore, events can be broken down into parts or factors, so that new factors can be interpreted as variations on already understood factors (allowing for some predictions to be calculated even before the most relevant data is collected). For example, the risks of driving while wearing new Google glasses can be extrapolated, with some reliability, from analogous distractions. As the glasses become more widely used, new information about rates of traffic accidents will allow more and more reliable predictions about their risks.

It is unclear whether Knight would have classified Giddens' manufactured risks as risks per se, or perhaps as new, incalculable uncertainties initially outside the scope of actuarial analysis. However, with the accumulation of data and with analysis of analogous factors, it is possible to perform statistical analysis on the new information and turn these incalculable uncertainties into calculable risks.

Another important issue raised in economics about the distortion of risk assessments is the common problem of discounting the future (Broome, 1994). In the context of assessing costs and benefits, people tend to discount future well-being if there are significant present costs (which are considered irrational if the future benefits significantly outweigh the costs). This effect tends to become more distorting depending on how far in the future the benefits will be accrued. This is an important factor in short-term irrational decision-making around issues such as climate change, for example, where the short-term costs of preventing climate change are dwarfed by the long-term costs of not preventing climate change.

Other approaches to risk: distortions and definitions

Another approach to theories of risk can be found in constructivist sociological theories of risk, where one important field of inquiry involves distortions in risk assessment. Why do

risk assessments fail, and how can accounts of those failures influence how we assess those risks? When the rational technologies of risk assessment fail, sociologists ask useful questions about which unacknowledged factors (many of them social in scope) might have influenced interpretations of the empirical data. For example, in writing about the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle in 1986, Vaughan (1996) traces a number of economic and political factors that dramatically changed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)'s internal culture of safety.

Mary Douglas goes even further in her critique, influentially arguing that risk cannot be defined only objectively, since what counts as a risk depends on the values held by groups or individuals. When "faced with estimating the credibility of sources, values, and probabilities, they come already primed with culturally learned assumptions and weightings" (Douglas, 1985, p. 84). She describes how risk assessments are especially influenced by the ways individuals perceive themselves in relation to marginalized groups or individuals construed as in some essential ways different from one's own group. Hazards are often attributed to these marginal groups (such as immigrants or, perhaps, sex workers and/or trafficked women) because "in all places at all times, the universe is moralized and politicized. Disasters that befoul the air and soil and poison the water are generally turned to political account: someone already unpopular is going to get blamed for it" (Douglas, 2002, p. 5). Her theory is intended not to repudiate the reality of risks, but to emphasize the cultural biases surrounding risk. One of Douglas's key insights is that "real risks do exist, but our perception of them is culturally biased" (Arnoldi, 2009, p. 40).

Many of these factors are alterable, while other factors are more difficult such as gender and racial discrimination and political instability. In practically assessing these risk factors, risk theory can point to some useful tools, such as focusing on calculable risks but not ignoring incalculable manufactured risk factors, and being aware of and trying to mitigate bias patterns.

Finally, criminologists in closely related fields of inquiry have defined and used risk factors in a variety of ways. Case and Haines (2009), for example, survey the field of youth offending (where the risk approach has been common for decades) and identify 13 distinct ways the effects of risk factors on offending have been characterized in the literature, ranging from causal to predictive to correlational associations. Stephenson, Giller, and Brown (2007, p. 9–10) usefully explain risk factors as being "associated with an increasing likelihood of the commencement, frequency, and duration of [a crime] … particularly when clustered together." They point out that the most predictively useful risk factors are derived from longitudinal studies, while acknowledging critiques of the method. When assessing the risk factors that can be incorporated into the TIP rankings, a useful working definition is that a risk factor is a factor associated with a particular behavior or event (such as trafficking) that is causally or predictively related to it, according to the best available research.

Tier rankings: methodology and the three P's (with prevention as the littlest P)

There has been a lack of transparency about how data is compiled for the Report and specific details about how tier rankings are assessed, which has been critiqued in a number of studies (Gallagher, 2011; Woodtich, 2011; Woodtich et al., 2009). The Report lists some of their data sources, such as US embassies, governmental officials, etc., which gives the impression that information for the Report may be obtained in old-fashioned ways, such as through rumors on the seafront, and in more modern ways, such

as online news or academic reports. How data is compiled is largely unknown. For instance, the TIP could be using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[3] published annually by Transparency International to gage the level of countries' corruption. This already established barometer could be used to measure this crucial risk factor in trafficking. In general, the opaque description of their methodology does not give credence to the Report and makes it difficult for others to make meaningful suggestions not only for data collection techniques, but also for the tier ranking system.

How countries are deficient in the "three P's" are not systematically discussed in the Report, and how prevention, protection, and prosecution are weighted in the calculation of tier rankings is unknown. In the description of the "three P's," prevention appears to carry little weight in the decision-making process for the rankings. Governments are evaluated for "minimum standards" on some types of measures of preventing human trafficking, such as public education and awareness campaigns, detecting exploitative labor practices, monitoring the distribution of visas and migration patterns, first responder training for the identification of victims of trafficking, and control of nationals deployed abroad (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013; US Department of State, 2011). While these very specific preventive factors are important, it is unclear how much they influence rankings. Furthermore, macro-level risks are ignored.

Structural, organizational, or governmental risk factors and corresponding preventive actions should be factored into tier rankings. For instance, studies mention that corrupt police, military, and governmental officials are risk factors (Agbu, 2003; Langberg, 2005; Logan et al., 2009; Seelke, 2010; Shelley, 2010; Woodtich, 2011). Corruption is a type of risk that is difficult to control, but it can be reduced and is therefore alterable. In terms of police corruption, civilian review boards, video cameras on police cars and thorough records of police stops were created to hold police accountable with the hopes of controlling police misconduct, including corruption (Walker, 2002; Weitzer, 2005). Tier rankings should also include macro-risks that are actionable (i.e., where governments are able to respond and potentially reduce risk and thereby help to enhance prevention).

More recently, the TIP has begun to explore some other avenues of risk, such as corporate accountability for the purposes of increasing sources of human capital and links to the exploitation of workers in the harvesting, collection, and mining of raw materials. The TIP has also begun evaluating other countries prevention policies (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013). These are important areas of exploration and suggest that risk factors may become more relevant in the rankings.

The two P's, protection and prosecution, dominate how tier rankings are established and while they may ultimately minimize risk, they do not directly use risk factors. Prosecution appears to be the major focus of the TIP. The purpose of this element is to prosecute and punish traffickers, which is expected to be accomplished through domestic and international legislation, law enforcement, prosecution of traffickers rather than victims, and meaningful penalties[4] (US Department of State, 2011). Protection, the second prong of the TVPA approach, focuses on providing services to victims in an effort to maximize recovery (US Department of State, 2011). Protection is described in terms of the "3Rs," which are rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013). The US government considers protection efforts to be an effective way to enhance deterrence and prosecution efforts (US Department of State, 2011). Prosecuting offenders and providing services to victims are much-needed aspects of trafficking policy, but they fail to address core risk factors.

The 2009 Report expanded the focus to countries that not only had trafficking problem, but included countries of origin, transit, and destination (Gallagher, 2011). This expansion is commendable as it is in the spirit of combatting human trafficking at its multiple junctions and reducing transnational criminal alliances and the movement of human cargo from origin to destination locations. Each nation should continue to be evaluated as origin, transit, and/or destination countries for human trafficking, but ultimately through a set of general risks and risks specific to the area. Further, the scope of expansion should reflect globalization in other ways. For instance, nations with a prolonged presence in other countries should be evaluated as contributing to the risk of human trafficking in host countries. These countries may be thought of as foreign actors, and some examples are occupation in the case of war, large military presence, national corporate presence, and providing humanitarian aid. This proposed fourth categorization is particularly relevant in a globalized world where foreign actors are deployed to other countries more readily and where foreign actors may take the shape of corporations and other entities. Countries' contributions to risk of trafficking abroad should be included in their overall tier ranking.

Types of human trafficking: risk on the world stage

Six themes of risk

Most research divides the root causes of trafficking into push factors (which overlap with supply factors) and pull factors (which overlap with demand factors). In an influential survey of the literature, Shelley (2010), for example, identifies general, non-regionally specific push factors over the last 30 years, including globalization, fewer employment opportunities in source countries, political instability after major sociopolitical changes, the decline of border patrols, gender and ethnic discrimination, the rise of new or resurgent disease epidemics, increasingly severe natural disasters, and increasing police and governmental corruption. Shelley (2010) identifies some major pull factors as increased demand for very cheap labor, the growth and increasing sophistication of transnational crime groups, and the absence of significant international efforts to address trafficking.

The push/pull model is often used in migration studies in other disciplines (Anthony, 1990). These models usually assume that migrants make deliberative decisions about where and when to migrate. Without that element of rational choice, they are usually classified as refugees, rather than migrants voluntarily subjected to push and pull factors (Cameron, 2013). Other critics, such as Chibnik (2011), point to other difficulties applying rational-choice models to various types of migration. For these and other reasons, we try a different approach to organizing findings in the field, refining some of Shelley's categories into six clusters.

In our analysis of the best research available on risk factors (or determinants) of human trafficking (see Tables 1–6), we find that the risks identified in the literature cluster into six main themes: globalization risks, crime risks, economic risks, political risks, demographic risks, and cultural and other risks. Most of the extant research is done at the regional level. In the tables, the category of "General" risks refers to the small number of studies that address the topic globally, while the other studies are grouped by region. In the last column of each table we identify whether that particular risk is or is not actionable, as discussed in the policy recommendations in the final section. Overall, while global patterns do emerge, there is also a complex interplay of risk factors specific to each region.

Method

This literature review began with a systematic search across major international social science databases, using a variety of concatenated keywords to identify research on risk factors of different types of human trafficking. We searched for such research conducted regionally and more generally. For example, we concatenated different combinations of "human trafficking," "labor trafficking," "sex trafficking," "risks," "determinants," "predictors," "causes," and a variety of regional keywords in EBSCOHost, Assia (CSA), and Google Scholar.

There were many results in this initial search, but most were irrelevant because they were not actually examples of original qualitative or quantitative research about trafficking causes or risk factors. Therefore, we sifted through this first group of publications to identify the relevant research.[5] We were able to obtain the full texts of most of the relevant scholarly results, which led to the attached bibliography that provided the basis of our analysis.

After reviewing this body of research, we compiled all the risk factors identified in each paper, then combined similar factors into thematic clusters. Most of the research was clearly regional or general, so we compared the results by continent. In the tables below, we compare whether these six clusters of specific risk factors have been identified as significantly at play in the best available research about each region.

Limitations

This literature review is intended to spark further quantitative and qualitative investigation into risk factors for trafficking, so it is by nature preliminary. We are limited by the available research, which is in turn limited by the available data. There is also a large body of critique of this research from different, conflicting perspectives (including, for example, robust debates about data sources – e.g., Tyldum, 2010). We made a point of including a broad survey of the extant research, even if the individual studies were contradictory, because that is the type of model we hope the US State Department will deploy when evaluating the literature. Despite our best efforts to survey the field as inclusively as we could, there may be relevant research that we missed, and we welcome the identification of such work. Our clusters could also be refined by future scholars in the field.

Our call for more research about risk factors should not be misunderstood as placing a credulous overconfidence in the precise quantification of such risks. First, we call for all types of research into risk, and qualitative research would have a lot of value in identifying risk factors, without the above problem. As far as quantitative research, it is unlikely that risk analysis could, for example, precisely predict why certain people end up as victims of trafficking (though, as described below, risk analysis might be able to connect macro-variables to an increased risk of being trafficked). We acknowledge the rigorous scholarship problematizing such attempts at precise risk calculations (see, for example, Beck, 1992; Bell & Mayerfeld, 1998), but, within these acknowledged limits, quantitative models can still be useful. For example, Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) use regression analysis (using standard and rare-events logit models on household surveys) to provide useful evidence about which macro-variables are more determinative than others. Such admittedly imperfect quantitative analysis could, in turn, be useful in refining the TIP or in developing preventative public policies. Furthermore, the TIP will continue to rank countries numerically, despite the above methodological limitations. Incorporating

analysis of risk factors into those numerical rankings can only improve them (even if the quantitative models in the analysis are imperfect).

An example of a limit on the quantification of risk would be distortions from over-simplified models of risk. For example, as Giddens (2002) elaborates, risks are not static, but rather fluctuate in crucial ways over time based on other factors. Risk cannot be defined strictly objectively, after all, since perceptions of risk are culturally and historically biased.

Another temptation when trying to make predictions might be to ascribe too much rationality to actors in particular scenarios. There is an extensive literature from cultural criminologists, qualitative researchers, and others that critiques assumptions of rationality and points to other complicating motivations (see, for example, Ferrell, 1997; Hayward, 2004; Katz, 1988; Lyng, 1990; Presdee, 2004; Sen, 1977). As Katz wrote in 1988 (Katz, p. 167), "there is now too much evidence to remain complacent with the view that offenders … approach [crime] in the calculating spirit of a money-making opportunity." The motivations of offenders such as traffickers are not tidily rational, but rather dependent on complex and interacting factors far beyond the cold calculation of the maximizing of their self-interest. It is important to note that much of the work making such critiques tends to focus on micro-variables (i.e., work that considers crime at the individual level of someone making rational or irrational choices), whereas the recommendations below focus on macro-variables. This emphasis on macro-variables to some extent, at least, mitigates the problems that, as noted above, can often occur with research done at the micro-level. However, this critique is relevant to macro-variables, too, since aggregated micro-behaviors are the basis of macro-variables, so some macro-models might contain embedded distortions. We are not focused on how to assess the micro-level foundations of the macro-level variables that will be of most concern to policy-makers (though such details will be critical for future scholars). For the purposes of this review, it is sufficient to note that scholars performing macro-level work must factor in how their assumptions of rationality might skew their results. Such research must strike a balance between useful simplification for the sake of modeling, and over-simplifications that distort.

As an attempt to reduce trafficking, we are suggesting approaches to refining the TIP's rankings in ways that might prompt governments to allocate more resources to prevention and reducing risks. The more research exists that conclusively (or at least suggestively) connects risk factors with rates of trafficking, the more governments might focus on reducing those risk factors.

Globalization risks

Many researchers link the increase in human trafficking to globalization (see Table 1), which features what Giddens and Beck describe as a new class of unprecedented and unpredictable "manufactured risks." For example, revolutionary new international communications tools (e.g., the Internet and mobile phones), the high volume of international cargo (human and otherwise), and weak border controls all facilitate the business of trafficking (Shelley, 2010).

Frequent travel abroad and overall high rates of long- and short-term migration associated with globalization, as discussed by Giddens and Beck, are identified throughout the literature as key risk factors in all regions (Adepoju, 2005; Chacon, 2006; Langberg, 2005; Logan et al., 2009; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; Petrunov, 2011). Intense migration pressure combined with tight official immigration policies leads immigrants who were denied legal entry to find illegal ways to enter other countries (Chacon,

Table 1. Globalization risk factors.

Globalization risk factors	General	Europe	Asia	North America	South America	Africa	Status*
Migration rates	X[1,10,11]	X[3,4,5]		X[8]	X[17]	X[18]	NA-G
Open immigration policies (sex trafficking)		X[5,6]					A
Restrictive immigration policies (other labor trafficking)	X[1,10,12,13]	X[6]	X[7]	X[8]	X[16]		A
Weak border controls	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[17]	X[1]	A
Large volume of international cargo	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]			NA-G
Rapid communications	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]			NA-G
Large preexisting networks (family and otherwise) in host countries		X[6]					NA-G
Foreign actors' high demand for sex workers	X[1]	X[1]	X[1,7]				A
Globalization of the sex industry		X[5]	X[7]		X[15]		NA-G

Sources: 1 Shelley, 2010; 2 Akee et al., 2007; 3 Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 4 Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; 5 Petrunov, 2011; 6 Salt, 2000; 7 Weiss, 2006; 8 Logan et al., 2009; 9 US Department of State, 2011; 10 Chacon, 2006; 11 Chand, 2008; 12 Sharma, 2005; 13 Agustin, 2006; 14 Montgomery, 2011; 15 Williams, 2011; 16 Seelke, 2010; 17 Langberg, 2005; 18 Adepoju, 2005; 19 Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; 20 Masud Ali, 2005; 21 Kelly, 2005; 22 Agbu, 2003; 23 Danailova-Trainor & Laczko; 24 25 Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 26 Segrave, 2009; 27 Limoncelli, 2009; 28 Akee et al., 2010; 29 Blanchette et al., 2013; 30 Molland, 2010.
Note: *A = Actionable, NA-G = Non-actionable globalization.

2006; Salt, 2000; Sharma, 2005). In Eastern Europe, Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) empirically identify the correlation between high migration rates and trafficking using a methodology better than most of the other studies. It is worth exploring it in some detail as a model of empirical research in the field. They analyzed a sample that was unusually representative of the broader population, using 5513 randomly selected household surveys from 82 regions in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine, as well a more detailed household survey of Moldova that they analyze as a case study. Their key result echoes other research on migration. They find that out of all the potential determinants tested, the size of migration flows in a surrounding region is by far the most significant predictor of individual trafficking. They argue this is due to these high-emigration regions' lower recruitment costs for traffickers, negative self-selection into migration, and the influence of loose migratory networks. They also find that in such high-migration regions, the rates of overall local criminality significantly increase the risk of trafficking (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010).

Related to this unprecedented new level of globalized migration are epiphenomena like stateless migrant people who live within recognized countries but without full legal status (e.g., Haitian migrants throughout the Caribbean, Tamil refugees in Russia, the Hill Tribes in Northern Thailand, or culturally isolated undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US) (Logan et al., 2009; Salt, 2000; Shelley, 2010). They are at significantly greater risk of being trafficked, since they have few legal or social protections and are often in desperate need of work or even basic necessities. Female political refugees from Thailand, China, and Eastern Europe who make it to South Africa, for example, find themselves with so few opportunities as refugees, and become so desperate, that they are often trafficked and re-trafficked for sex throughout South Africa via an established criminal network of other refugee residents (Adepoju, 2005, p. 92).

While declining border controls and overall border instability are cited as a risk factor in many regions, there are conflicting findings about the influence of official immigration policies (Agustin, 2006; Chacon, 2006; Logan et al., 2009; Petrunov, 2011; Salt, 2000; Seelke, 2010; Sharma, 2005; Shelley, 2010; Weiss, 2006). For example, in both Germany and the Netherlands, migrants entering the country to work as unskilled laborers are given guest worker status and discouraged from permanently settling. This results in "circular migration," where migrants take short-term jobs, save their income, and then return to their country of origin (Doomernik, 2013). It has been argued that this leads to facilitated migration by traffickers, who provide visas and funds for massive numbers of foreign women immigrate to countries like Germany and the Netherlands as "entertainers" to participate in the sex industry. It appears that many of these guest workers then end up as victims of trafficking who are most often put to work in locations where law enforcement is lacking. For example, brothels and windows were the original target of prostitution laws in the Netherlands and were thus heavily regulated. As a means of sidestepping such regulation, vulnerable individuals often engage in sex work in streetwalking zones and escort services, which are under-regulated. It is in these areas that there have been high levels of illegal immigrants reported (Wagenaar, 2006).

Trafficking in persons has often been used as a pretext for regulating the flow of immigration (Chapkis, 1995; Doezema, 2000; Sharma, 2005). Yet the actual impact of immigration policies on risks of trafficking depends on the type of trafficking. Open immigration policies have been found to be associated with a higher risk of sex trafficking, but a lower risk of other forms of labor trafficking (Agustin, 2006; Chacon, 2006; Logan et al., 2009; Petrunov, 2011; Salt, 2000; Seelke, 2010; Sharma, 2005; Shelley, 2010; Weiss, 2006). For example, Europe's opening of its borders in 2001 actually led to higher levels of sex trafficking from Central and Eastern Europe, where preexisting regional prostitution rings suddenly had newly accessible markets in Western Europe (Petrunov, 2011; Salt, 2000).

One interpretation of the above inconsistency is that a key difference between the two subcategories of human trafficking is that sex work is illegal almost everywhere, whereas most other work that trafficked people do is not inherently illegal. Open immigration policies provide most laborers in search of better economic opportunities abroad legal means by which to pursue them. This does not hold for most sex workers. One problem with this interpretation is that in at least two empirical studies, legalization of prostitution is preliminarily correlated with a higher risk of trafficking (Cho, Dreher, & Neumayer, 2013; Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011).[6] However, Akee, Basu, Bedi, and Chau (2010)'s empirical study across 130 countries on the effect of prostitution laws on reported incidence of human trafficking contradicts these other two studies, finding evidence of a negative correlation (that is, that prostitution legalization reduces trafficking). Furthermore, other qualitative research is more aligned with Akee et al. (2010) (Limoncelli, 2009; Segrave, 2009). More objective research on this controversial issue needs to occur to test the various hypotheses, creating a better foundation for policy recommendations.

Another notable globalization risk factor identified in a number of regions is the huge demand for prostitution among foreign actors (e.g., United Nations peacekeepers, humanitarian workers, military personnel, corporate employees, and other clusters of international groups) (Mazurana, 2005; Shelley, 2010; Weiss, 2006). Demand for prostitution spiked dramatically near UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, for example, and humanitarian workers throughout the world are widely associated with an increased demand for local prostitutes (Mazurana, 2005; Shelley, 2010). American soldiers in military bases in South Korea are the main customers of local brothels, where many of the women are trafficked specifically to cater to American tastes, yet critics allege that

local and international authorities largely ignore these widespread activities that put women at significant risk of trafficking (Weiss, 2006).

Crime risks

The explosion in sophisticated transnational criminal organizations is cited as a significant risk factor across the regions (see Table 2) (Adepoju, 2005; Agbu, 2003; Agustin, 2006; Langberg, 2005; Logan et al., 2009; Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; Petrunov, 2011; Seelke, 2010; Shelley, 2010; Weiss, 2006; Williams, 2011). These organizations are defined as "mobile, well organized, internationally adaptable and can be involved in multiple activities in several countries" (Salt, 2000, p. 36). Some criminal networks are temporary, but many are connected to preexisting local and international organized crime groups that in recent decades have expanded their activities into new international markets (Salt, 2000). In 2007, this transnational criminal activity accounted for $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion in illicit revenue, which represented more than 6% of the world economy (Shelley, 2010). Organized crime groups are motivated by the comparatively huge and easy profits from trafficking, especially sex trafficking. For example, Bulgarian traffickers bring an estimated 500 million to 1 billion EUR per year into the Bulgarian economy, which is a large portion of the struggling country's overall GDP (Petrunov, 2011).

The lack of significant anti-trafficking legislation is cited as a regional risk factor across the regions, along with the lack of enforcement of any existing legislation

Table 2. Crime risk factors.

Crime risk factors	General	Europe	Asia	North America	South America	Africa	Status*
Organized crime	X[1]	X[4,5]	X[7]	X[8,13]	X[15,16,17]	X[18,22]	A
Corruption	X[1]	X[1,5,22]	X[1]	X[1,8]	X[1,15,16,17]	X[1,22,29]	A
Low rates of prosecution in source countries	X[1]	X[5]		X[8,19]	X[15,16,17]	X[18,22,29]	A
Weak anti-trafficking legislation	X[1]	X[4]	X[7]	X[19]	X[15,16,17]	X[18,22]	A
Weak counter-trafficking efforts internationally or in host countries	X[1,2]		X[14]		X[15]	X[18,29]	A
Overall criminality in high migration regions		X[3]				X[18]	A
Granting trafficking victims legal asylum	X[2]						A
Racially specific demand (in sex work or other forms of labor)		X[21]	X[7,14,30]		X[15]	X[18,29]	NA
Legalization of prostitution (conflicting risk effects)	X[2,24,27,28]	X[25,26]				X[29]	A

Sources: 1 Shelley, 2010; 2 Akee et al., 2007; 3 Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 4 Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; 5 Petrunov, 2011; 6 Salt, 2000; 7 Weiss, 2006; 8 Logan et al., 2009; 9 US Department of State, 2011; 10 Chacon, 2006; 11 Chand, 2008; 12 Sharma, 2005; 13 Agustin, 2006; 14 Montgomery, 2011; 15 Williams, 2011; 16 Seelke, 2010; 17 Langberg, 2005; 18 Adepoju, 2005; 19 Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; 20 Masud Ali, 2005; 21 Kelly, 2005; 22 Agbu, 2003; 23 Danailova-Trainor & Laczko; 24 Cho et al., 2013; 25 Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 26 Segrave, 2009; 27 Limoncelli, 2009; 28 Akee et al., 2010; 29 Blanchette et al., 2013; 30 Molland, 2010.
Note: *A = Actionable, NA = Non-actionable.

(Adepoju, 2005; Agbu, 2003; Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; Langberg, 2005; Logan et al., 2009; Nurkic-Kacapo, 2011; Petrunov, 2011; Seelke, 2010; Shelley, 2010; Weiss, 2006; Williams, 2011). In this context of low levels of prosecution for trafficking, crime rings have redirected much of their activity to what they perceive as a low-risk business. As Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli (2010: 18–19) stated, "whether human trafficking is by organized groups of criminals or by small, loose networks of entrepreneurs, the benefits so greatly outweigh the costs that a willing cadre of traffickers is assured."

The scale of corruption of government officials also complements this organized crime. In Bosnia, for example, Human Rights Watch found that crime groups arranged for state immigration officials to frequent local brothels in exchange for ignoring the fake documents of the victims in those brothels (Agbu, 2003). In Nigeria, routine bribery of government officials is an unpopular but persistent fact of life, and this deep and systemic corruption has led to the lack of prosecution of sex trafficking rings so large and profitable that Nigeria is now one of the main sources of trafficked prostitutes in Italy, Holland, Belgium, and France (Agbu, 2003).

Researchers have begun to focus on the internal dynamics of these criminal groups in order to identify how they respond to anti-trafficking policies and other disincentives (Akee, Basu, Bedi, & Chau, 2007; Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; Petrunov, 2011; Wheaton et al., 2010). For example, Akee et al. (2007) find that granting asylum to trafficked victims in host countries may actually increase the inflow of new trafficking victims in some situations, because of its effects on the perverse incentives of trafficking groups. It increases their profit motive by raising the prices of prostitution in the short and medium term, which can lead to higher rates of newly trafficked women. Since there are other compelling arguments for granting asylum to trafficking victims, policy-makers might use Akee et al. (2007) research to develop disincentives accordingly.

Economic risks

One of the most frequently cited underlying risk factors is poverty (see Table 3). Lack of jobs or educational opportunities in source countries combines with the perception of vastly better economic opportunities in host countries. Traffickers often initially promise opportunities for relatively enormous profits in jobs abroad to deeply impoverished people in source countries, which can lead some to initially consent to what they perceive as profitable business arrangements. In Bulgaria, for example, trafficked women are often promised what to them is a fortune of up to 5000 EUR per month from sex work abroad. Unfortunately, most of these Bulgarian victims end up earning almost nothing in the first six months or so (under the pretense of paying off debts), then about 10–30% of their subsequent earned revenue (Petrunov, 2011).

Widespread, multigenerational poverty is a particularly strong risk factor in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, aggravated by recent economic crises (Adepoju, 2005; Agbu, 2003; Truong, 2006) As Adepoju (2005, p. 81) writes about children in that region who are sold to traffickers by their own parents, "dramatic changes in Africa's economic fortunes have undermined the abilities of families to meet [their] basic needs … Driven by desperation, some fall prey to traffickers' rackets in desperate search for survival."

In other regions, poverty is not always correlated with risk. In Europe, for example, some segments of trafficked migrants come from low socioeconomic conditions in their source countries, but many others are relatively well educated and enjoyed high social status at home (e.g., many women trafficked into Poland from Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia have university degrees) (Salt, 2000).

Table 3. Economic risk factors.

Economic risk factors	General	Europe	Asia	North America	South America	Africa	Status*
Poverty	X[1,2,10,11,23]	X[4]	X[7,30]	X[8]	X[15,16,17]	X[18]	A
Lack of employment opportunities	X[1,10]	X[6]	X[14,30]	X[8]	X[15,16,17]	X[18]	NA
Lack of educational opportunities	X[1,2]				X[17]	X[18]	NA
High rate of agricultural employment	X[2]					X[29]	NA
Rural to urban migration	X[1]	X[1]	X[1,30]	X[1]	X[1]	X[1,18,29]	A
Unequal regional development in source countries	X[1]	X[1]	X[1,7,30]	X[1,19]	X[1]	X[1,18,29]	A
Perception of better economic opportunities in host countries	X[1,10,11]	X[6]		X[8,19]	X[15,16]	X[18,29]	A
Demand for cheap labor	X[1,2]				X[16,17]	X[18]	NA-G
Higher standard of living in host countries/global economic inequality	X[1,2,11]		X[14]	X[19]	X[15]	X[18,29]	NA-G
Possibility of relatively high revenue from trafficking		X[5]	X[14]			X[18]	A
"Flexibilization" of employment		X[6]					NA-G

Sources: 1 Shelley, 2010; 2 Akee et al., 2007; 3 Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 4 Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; 5 Petrunov, 2011; 6 Salt, 2000; 7 Weiss, 2006; 8 Logan et al., 2009; 9 US Department of State, 2011; 10 Chacon, 2006; 11 Chand, 2008; 12 Sharma, 2005; 13 Agustin, 2006; 14 Montgomery, 2011; 15 Williams, 2011; 16 Seelke, 2010; 17 Langberg, 2005; 18 Adepoju, 2005; 19 Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; 20 Masud Ali, 2005; 21 Kelly, 2005; 22 Agbu, 2003; 23 Danailova-Trainor & Laczko; 24 Cho et al., 2013; 25 Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 26 Segrave, 2009; 27 Limoncelli, 2009; 28 Akee et al., 2010; 29 Blanchette et al., 2013; 30 Molland, 2010.
Note: *A = Actionable, NA = Non-actionable, NA-G = Non-actionable globalization.

The biggest economic pull factor is the hugely increased demand for cheap labor in relatively wealthy host countries. Standards of living and per capita GDP have grown in these countries at the same time as birth rates have decreased, leading to a shortage of local citizens willing to work for relatively low wages. Demand for sex workers, in turn, is a persistent and critical pull factor for sex trafficking, only aggravated by increased standards of living in host countries. Demand in these low-wage sectors becomes so high that people become acclimatized to trafficking victims regularly working in certain industries, like sex workers in European brothels or domestic workers in the US (Logan et al., 2009).

Neoliberal economic reforms (which are another aspect of globalization) can also lead to new risks. As Salt (2000, p. 36) puts it, for example, neoliberal "flexibilization" of employment in the service sector across Europe has provided many opportunities for illegal working. An unintended consequence of such reforms is a dramatically higher risk of trafficking for economic migrants in those sectors.

Political risks

Domestic and regional conflicts are risk factors in all regions (see Table 4) (Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; Petrunov, 2011; Salt, 2000; Shelley, 2010, etc.) As Shelley (2010, p. 50) writes,

Table 4. Political risk factors.

Political risk factors	General	Europe	Asia	North America	South America	Africa	Status*
Conflicts in source countries and regions	X[1,2]	X[1,4,5,6]	X[1]	X[8]	X[1,16,17]	X[1,18]	A
Domestic political instability and other political issues	X[1]	X[4,5,6]		X[8]	X[16,17]	X[18]	A
Crises in financial systems	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[1,16]	X[1]	A
Statelessness/"Undocumented" status	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]	X[8]	X[1]		A
Number of border regions outside the control of states	X[1]	X[1]	X[1]		X[1]	X[1]	A

Sources: 1 Shelley, 2010; 2 Akee et al., 2007; 3 Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 4 Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; 5 Petrunov, 2011; 6 Salt, 2000; 7 Weiss, 2006; 8 Logan et al., 2009; 9 US Department of State, 2011; 10 Chacon, 2006; 11 Chand, 2008; 12 Sharma, 2005; 13 Agustin, 2006; 14 Montgomery, 2011; 15 Williams, 2011; 16 Seelke, 2010; 17 Langberg, 2005; 18 Adepoju, 2005; 19 Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; 20 Masud Ali, 2005; 21 Kelly, 2005; 22 Agbu, 2003; 23 Danailova-Trainor & Laczko; 24 Cho et al., 2013; 25 Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 26 Segrave, 2009; 27 Limoncelli, 2009; 28 Akee et al., 2010; 29 Blanchette et al., 2013; 30 Molland, 2010.
Note: *A = Actionable.

"millions of refugees from these conflicts are uprooted from their traditional societies with no viable means of support … making them ripe for exploitation by traffickers." The political and social instability that followed the fall of Communist regimes in Europe and Central Asia in the 1990s, for example, is correlated with a markedly steep rise in the amount and complexity of organized crime, including trafficking rings (Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011).

A distinctive political risk factor involves the number of border regions outside of recognized state control. Crime, especially smuggling and trafficking, is considered prevalent in conflict-laden border regions like Transnistria (or Transdniester), the breakaway territory between Ukraine and Moldova that declared itself independent from Moldova in 1990 (Shelley, 2010). For example, the European Parliament's delegation to Maldova in 2002 called Transnistria "a black hole in which illegal trade in arms, the trafficking in human beings and the laundering of criminal finance was carried on."[7] The liminal legal citizenship of residents of these ambiguous regions has been found to lead to high risks of trafficking.

Demographic risks

Gender and ethnic discrimination is cited as an important risk factor across the regions (see Table 5). Women's economic and social vulnerability often puts them at particular risk and is connected to deeply patriarchal gender roles. In many parts of Asia, for example, trafficking is affected by rigidly patriarchal Confucian gender roles (where prostitution is regarded as a necessary evil and women are expected to either only have procreative sex or else to "entertain men and allow their bodies to be used for sexual recreation") (Weiss, 2006, p. 316). In Albania, in contrast, weakened traditional family ties are cited as a risk factor (Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011).

The local status of children is often related to whether they are at risk. For example, higher dependency ratios (i.e., the proportion of children relative to adults) are correlated generally with increased risk (Akee et al., 2007). Local rates of child labor are also strong

Table 5. Demographic risk factors.

Demographic risk factors	General	Europe	Asia	North America	South America	Africa	Status*
Population growth	X[1]		X[1]				A
Gender imbalance	X[1]		X[1,7]				A
Gender and ethnic discrimination	X[1,10,11]	X[1,4,6]	X[1,7]		X[1,15,16,17]	X[1,18]	A
Patriarchal gender roles	X[1,10,11]		X[7,30]		X[16,17]	X[18]	NA
Weak traditional family ties		X[4]				X[18]	A
High dependency ratio	X[2]						NA
High incidence of child labor	X[2]		X[14]			X[18]	A
Prevalence of runaway/homeless youth				X[8]	X[16]	X[18]	A
Multi-generational histories of coerced labor				X[8]			A
Rate of disabilities	X[9]	X[9]	X[9]	X[9]			NA
Racially specific demand (in sex work or other forms of labor)		X[21]	X[7,14]		X[15,29]	X[18]	NA

Sources: 1 Shelley, 2010; 2 Akee et al., 2007; 3 Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 4 Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; 5 Petrunov, 2011; 6 Salt, 2000; 7 Weiss, 2006; 8 Logan et al., 2009; 9 US Department of State, 2011; 10 Chacon, 2006; 11 Chand, 2008; 12 Sharma, 2005; 13 Agustin, 2006; 14 Montgomery, 2011; 15 Williams, 2011; 16 Seelke, 2010; 17 Langberg, 2005; 18 Adepoju, 2005; 19 Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; 20 Masud Ali, 2005; 21 Kelly, 2005; 22 Agbu, 2003; 23 Danailova-Trainor & Laczko; 24 Cho et al., 2013; 25 Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 26 Segrave, 2009; 27 Limoncelli, 2009; 28 Akee et al., 2010; 29 Blanchette et al., 2013; 30 Molland, 2010.
Note: *A = Actionable, NA = Non-actionable.

predictors of risk for children. In Albania, 12% of Albanian children (or approximately 120,000) have been found to be exploited in various forms of servitude (Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011). Such widespread normalization of child labor puts the children at much higher risk of trafficking.

Race can also be a risk factor, since traffickers often target victims because of a high demand in a destination country for a specific race for sex work or other labor, or because discrimination has left particular racial or ethnic groups vulnerable (Weiss, 2006). In racially homogenous regions, there is often widespread antipathy toward foreigners, which can exacerbate trafficking (Weiss 2006, p. 334).

The TIP itself identifies some demographic risk factors without explicitly incorporating those factors into their rankings. For example, in the 2012 TIP report there is a section on "disabilities as a risk factor," which discusses how discrimination and exclusion of people with disabilities can put them at risk of being trafficked. It describes the abuse of deaf domestic workers in the UK, addicts forced to work fields in the US, developmentally disabled and mentally ill people enslaved in Chinese kilns, and developmentally disabled people forced to work as street peddlers in India. More quantitative research following up on these examples could identify correlations that could become the sound scientific basis for public policy initiatives.

Cultural and other risks

Culturally specific perceptions of life in host countries can be push factors, as well, such as the idea that Western European countries are full of "easy earnings" (Salt, 2000). There are conflicting results about some of these complicated cultural attitudes, though. In

Brazil, for example, Blanchette, Silva, and Bento (2013, p. 206) found that "far from being typically a 'crazy' or 'deluded' decision, based on childish fantasies of Europe, migration for sex work is more often relatively well planned and informed by the experiences of friends and colleagues who have already migrated." Furthermore, in Brazil, sex work is stigmatized but not historically criminalized, which raises questions about who defines who qualifies as truly trafficked.

Lack of risk awareness can itself be a risk factor. Across regions, households with higher awareness of the phenomenon of human trafficking and households that use the television as the main source of information are less likely to have a trafficked family member (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010). This finding suggests that targeted awareness campaigns can significantly reduce risks.

Isolation among migrants in host countries can lead them to become vulnerable to traffickers. In North America, for example, separation from family, not speaking English, having substantial cultural differences from their community, or being undocumented make migrants especially vulnerable to traffickers (Logan et al., 2009).

Natural disasters are correlated with a high risk of trafficking (see Table 6) because of their destabilizing effects. Some authors, like Giddens and Beck, include natural disasters in the category of globalization, since global warming has led to a new frequency, scale, and range of disasters. The 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, for example, left many people displaced and desperate. As Shelley (2010, p. 38) writes, "deprived of their land and without increased opportunities in nonagricultural sectors, these desperate people are often exploited by human traffickers."

Public health crises are also correlated with high risks of trafficking. The most prominent example of a destabilizing health crisis putting people at risk is the ongoing AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many widows in the region become the sole breadwinners in their families after losing husbands to AIDS. Without local job opportunities, or because of gender discrimination or the stigma that they are HIV positive, they desperately migrate in search of better economic opportunities, falling victim to traffickers (Adepoju, 2005, p. 83). In southern Africa, the common perception that sexual intercourse

Table 6. Cultural and other risk factors.

Cultural and other risk factors	General	Europe	Asia	North America	South America	Africa	Status*
Public health crises	X[1]		X[1]	X[1]		X[1,18]	A
Natural disasters	X[1]		X[1]	X[1]	X[1,16]	X[1]	A
Culturally specific perceptions of the west		X[6]			X[16,29]	X[29]	A
Cultural acceptance of trafficking			X[14, 30]	X[8]	X[17,29]	X[29]	A
Lack of risk awareness		X[3]	X[30]			X[18]	A
Isolation among immigrants in host countries				X[8]			A

Sources: 1 Shelley, 2010; 2 Akee et al., 2007; 3 Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 4 Nurkic-Kacapor, 2011; 5 Petrunov, 2011; 6 Salt, 2000; 7 Weiss, 2006; 8 Logan et al., 2009; 9 US Department of State, 2011; 10 Chacon, 2006; 11 Chand, 2008; 12 Sharma, 2005; 13 Agustin, 2006; 14 Montgomery, 2011; 15 Williams, 2011; 16 Seelke, 2010; 17 Langberg, 2005; 18 Adepoju, 2005; 19 Gozdziack & Collett, 2005; 20 Masud Ali, 2005; 21 Kelly, 2005; 22 Agbu, 2003; 23 Danailova-Trainor & Laczko; 24 Cho et al., 2013; 25 Jackobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 26 Segrave, 2009; 27 Limoncelli, 2009; 28 Akee et al., 2010; 29 Blanchette et al., 2013; 30 Molland, 2010.
Note: *A = Actionable.

with young girls cures or prevents HIV/AIDS leads to a high demand for very young sex workers. This demand puts pre-pubescent girls throughout the region at higher risk of trafficking (as well as contracting HIV once they are trafficked) (Adepoju, 2005, p. 84).

Because the empirical research is scanty, it is worth noting some suggestive preliminary findings about which factors are not as strongly correlated with trafficking risks. Akee et al. (2007), for example, find that neither rates of international trade nor rates of international tourism are positively correlated with rates of trafficking.

Another important result inconsistent with most other work but worth noting, because of the robustness of their methodology, is that Mahmoud and Trebesch found "remarkably little evidence for supply-side [or push] factors" (2010, p. 182), such as various proxies for desperation and poverty in the tested regions. Further research would clarify whether there are alternative explanations, such as lack of sufficient variation within the population they studied to identify correlations – intuitively, there is much more variation in push factors between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, for example, than between regions within Moldova, so perhaps the push factors would be statistically relevant in broader cross-country analyses. However, when comparing risk factors, it is worth noting that one of the more methodologically robust studies found much stronger statistical evidence for pull factors.

Policy recommendations

This review of literature on the risks of trafficking was formulated with prominent theories of risk in mind. As Giddens (2002) described, new classes of risk have emerged and some of these are a game we are willing to play, whereas others are not. Many facets of globalized risk related to trafficking may not be altered or extracted, as they are inherent to the globalized world. However, a sizable number of global and non-global risks are alterable, and governments may take action to remedy these risks to combat human rights abuse in illicit labor practice. The State Department may consider this review and the six identified themes of risk when reformulating how to assess countries via TIP's tier rankings. Policy implications based on this review are outlined below.

Risk frameworks should use evidence-based research

In 2006–2007, the US Government Accountability Office (USGAO) discussed that the human trafficking antidote (the three P's) was devised based on untested assumptions and that there was no evidence that they were having an impact (as cited in Gallagher, 2011). This review of more recent studies on risk factors is an important beginning to informed ways of devising tests about assumptions of risk. Before effective preventive measures can be included, the general risk and regional risk factors of trafficking must be thoroughly explored in empirical studies. This paper details the best available research and future studies may build upon our framework and assist in the identification of key preventive factors, and ultimately generate evidence-based research on preventing human trafficking.

Repurposing TIP would not be fair

The Report specifies that the tier rankings are primarily influenced by governmental commitment to fighting trafficking. Some researchers such as Gallagher (2011) allude to whether the TIP should be re-purposed from focusing on improvements in a government's responses to trafficking, to directly measuring actual improvements in the

trafficking problem in that country. Based on this review, the scope of risk and especially the element of non-actionable risk would make such repurposings unfair to certain countries. For instance, factors such as migration rates, large volume of international cargo, and large preexisting networks in host countries (see Tables 1–6) are thought to contribute to the risk of human trafficking. However, many of these factors are acceptable, even desirable risks, and countries would be unable or unwilling to change these risk factors. In certain regions there may also be more difficult actionable risks. The TIP should remain focused on governments' response to risk so that even though a country has a more difficult actionable risk, such as extreme poverty, improvement in ranking is based on governments' efforts to respond to this risk as opposed to its prevalence.

The focus should be on actionable risk with awareness of acceptable and unalterable risk

We identified *actionable* risks that are alterable risks, such as weak border controls, organized crime, and corruption. These types of risks should be key focuses in building risk frameworks. Other actionable risks may be quite difficult to address. While some may feel that structural problems such as gender inequality are not actionable, in light of globalization, certain risks that are world problems may require long-term, collaborative solutions. Next, we assert that some risks are *non-actionable* because they are acceptable elements of living in a globalized world. For instance, historically migration was often crucial for the survival of populations (Cameron, 2013) and this is often still the case and migrants can positively influence host countries (Jennissen, 2007). We do not suggest that legal migration should be curbed through strict immigration policies. Also, open borders such as in the EU, may increase sex trafficking, but open borders due to unions provide opportunities and are part and parcel of living in a globalized world. Some of these modern risks may even be deemed *unalterable*, such as rapid communication. In this latter example, it is impossible to put the genie back in the bottle. Some manufactured risk is acceptable, even desirable, whereas some are not. Finally, some risks are simply not feasible to alter, such as high rates of agricultural employment, which likely is crucial to economic stability in certain regions. An all-inclusive list of risk provides us with knowledge about the complexity of human trafficking risk, and in the future some risks may change class, but actionable risk should be at the core of risk frameworks.

The all-encompassing definition of trafficking by TIP calls for macro-level risk factors

Most scholarly work focuses on one type of trafficking such as child sex trafficking and most do not include the many types outlined in the TIP. Because the TIP view human trafficking through a wide lens (forced labor, bonded labor, debt bondage, forced marriage, forced begging, exploitative adoption, child sex tourism, child soldiering, sex trafficking, and organ removal (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013), it is unfeasible to assess risk on the micro-level. For instance, the level of individual risk of a young unemployed, Nigerian woman of being the victim of sex trafficking versus organ removal may be quite distinct. While certain kinds of macro-risk apply to certain kinds of trafficking, macro-risks may more readily apply across different kinds of trafficking. Due to the broad scope of the TIP's definition of trafficking, macro-level risk factors are more useful for assessment.

The types of trafficking may need to be disaggregated

The TIP combines data on a wide variety of trafficking types (from coerced organ donors to domestic servitude), some of which have conflicting risk factors. There are advantages and disadvantages to aggregating or parsing out these disparate types of trafficking. One advantage of aggregating is that there is a lot of overlap in types of trafficking. Sometimes over time there is even movement between types of trafficking for single individuals who start in one type of exploitative situation then move into another – people who are vulnerable in one type of situation can become vulnerable to another type. More work can be done on how common these overlaps really are. One advantage of parsing out the types of trafficking would be that some risk factors work very differently on different types of trafficking. For example, as discussed above, major changes to European migration policies had opposite effects on labor trafficking and sex trafficking. As more work is done on risk factors, it may make sense to disaggregate types of trafficking in the TIP to account for these conflicting effects.

Risk should be evaluated systematically

Risk should be evaluated systematically. We discussed six thematic categories of risk: globalized, crime, economic, political, demographic, and cultural and other. We chose to organize risk factors by type so that each area may be evaluated and ultimately given a certain calculable weight. This type of organization could be useful for future TIP reports if prevention becomes emphasized more. Some types of risk may be more prevalent in certain areas, but each country may gage their annual improvement by thematic area of risk, which may be useful for deciding where to allocate resources, including annual funds.

The categorization of countries as origin, transit, destination countries should include the category of foreign actors. As patterns emerge, regions or areas may be assessed

Patterns of regional risks may become more apparent and ideas may be devised to improve trafficking situations between origin, transit, and destination countries as opposed to country by country level risk. In light of global features such as high levels of migration between countries, open borders, and prevalent travel, it may be beneficial to address risk not only by country, but by area or region. Further, with the high levels of deployment of foreign actors to other countries for purposes of war, humanitarian aid, national corporations etc., countries should be held accountable for how they influence trafficking when deployed.

Ultimately, a matrix connecting types of risk to categorization should be created

Actionable risks, within the six thematic types outlined may be assessed based on nations' risk as origin (push factors), transit, destination (pull factors) countries, and as foreign actors. Ultimately, a matrix outlining the connections between types (the six outlined) and categorization of risk will allow for a more fine-grained look about how countries play various roles in human trafficking. Currently, there should be more comprehensive research before this is constructed and applied.

Prevention should be a big P in tier ranking calculations

The Report should adopt a clear way of calculating tier rankings with more of an emphasis on prevention, and be transparent about their assessment. Transparency will eliminate speculation about US political issues influencing the rankings that are discussed in numerous works (see Weiss, 2006; Woodtich, 2011) and allow countries to understand very specifically how they may improve their rankings. Woodtich (2011) outlined a suggested framework for tier calculations. Her suggestion is that countries should be ranked on a 100 point scale as opposed to being designated Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 2 watch list, and Tier 3. This would make the assessment more quantitative, hence more systematic. Whether the tier rankings are based on a 10 point scale, a 50 point scale, or a 100 point scale is irrelevant, but the main point is that there should be a clear, more systematic calculation. Further, Woodtich (2011) called for four criteria as opposed to three, with the inclusion of data collection and research and this is a great suggestion especially in the area of risk where there are limited empirical studies. Lastly, she felt that the most points should go to prevention with her suggestion of 40 points for prevention, 25 for protection, 25 for prosecution, and 10 for data collection and research. Her sentiments reflect the thrust of the paper with the idea that of the three P's that prevention should be a big P, and perhaps more prominent than the others especially as more information is obtained about actionable risk.

The TIP has been critiqued for many reasons, but there are a limited number of works about solutions. We wanted to explore prevention as it is not a conceptually well-developed feature of the TIP, yet there are plenty of studies about national and regional risk of human trafficking. Of the "three P's," prevention is an area where improvement is possible. Although the proposed framework for thinking about risk will need more development as more knowledge is acquired, it may be a useful guide for future empirical studies and to improving how the TIP assesses prevention. We hope to witness an influx of evidence based research on actionable risk factors and a transparent way that this is assessed in tier rankings.

Notes

1. A publication used by the United States Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.
2. Countries are assigned a tier ranking based on a variety of factors. Full compliance with the TVPA results in a ranking of Tier 1. Failure to comply with the minimum standards of the TVPA, but showing a significant effort to meet these standards, results in a ranking of Tier 2. Countries are assigned a ranking of Tier 2 watch list if they meet the requirements for Tier 2, but show a significant number of (or significant increase in) the "number of victims of severe forms of trafficking," a lack of an increase in effort to combat trafficking in persons since the previous year, and/or a demonstrated commitment to take additional steps to meet compliance over the next year. Finally, failure to attempt to comply with the minimum standards of the TVPA results in a Tier 3 ranking. The assessment of which tier is appropriate is based on the "three P's": prosecution, protection, and prevention (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013; US Department of State, 2011).
3. Annual Report published by Transparency International (TI), which ranks countries "by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys."
4. Meaningful penalties include a maximum prison sentence of at least four years for traffickers, and the consideration of the severity of the crime on an individual basis (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2013).
5. We decided to include a small number of rigorous general reviews of the field, though we then tried to also include any academic research that they cited. Some of these more general surveys of the problem included many other types of sources, such as journalistic sources, which we did not directly analyze or include.

6. Their monadic statistical models invite thorough critique, especially since Cho et al. (2013, p. 4) assert that "the view that the legalization of prostitution may reduce trafficking is typically held by those who believe that the choice to sell one's sexual services for money need not always be forced, but can be a voluntary occupational choice." The idea that legalization may reduce trafficking is best understood as a reasonable and testable hypothesis, not a necessarily biased opinion.
7. European Parliament, "Chairman's Report – Ad Hoc Delegation to Moldova," June 2002.

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